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== Primitive awareness ==
=== Properties ===* (Nida-Rümelin, 20192016) assumes that primitive awarenes awareness is not the result of [[introspection]] or of phenomenal reflection.<ref name="MR16NR16"/>* Since undergoing an experience does not necessarily involve reflecting upon that experience, primitive awareness does not involve phenomenal reflection. Since it seems however to be required as a precondition, primitive awareness seems to be ''pre-reflective''.<ref name="MR16NR16"/>
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This page aims to list (the) arious various notions of awareness in use today.
According to (Nida-Rümelin, 2016)<ref name="MR16NR16">Martine Nida-Rümelin, ''The experience property framework'', 2016</ref>, "experiences are such that, undergoing the experience nevvessarily necessarily involves that the subject is aware of undergoing it." This kind of awareness is called primitive awareness:
;Definition: ''Primitive awareness'' is the kind of awareness for which the claim is true that it is impossible to undergo an experience without being aware of undergoing it.
* Since primitive awareness also does not require conceptualizing the experience one undergoes, but seems to be required for forming a concept of a given experience on the basis of one's own experience, it is ''pre-conceptual''.
* Any experiencing subject is immediately aware, in the sense here at issue, of every specific aspect of what it is like for it to live through moment <math>m</math> while it is living through moment <math>m</math>.
= Phenomenal presence =
The clearest case of awareness in this sense are "episodes in which a subject is presented with a [[qualia#Content qualia|c-quale]] like, for instance, a particular slightly reddish blue, the sound of a violin, the smell of basil or the taste of ginger."<ref name="NR16"/>
= Perceptual awareness =
"In perception we are aware of the properties of things around us in a way which
intuitively deserves to be called immediate. We seem to have direct access to certain
properties of things just by looking. The intuition of immediacy or directness here at
issue can be cashed out in various ways and there is no agreement among philosophers
about how it should be accounted for."<ref name="NR16"/>
== References ==
