From Mathematical Consciousness Science Wiki
Jump to navigation Jump to search
 Note: This page has not yet reached minimally viable content. Please help improve the page and remove this note when appropriate.

This page aims to list (the) various notions of awareness in use today.

Primitive awareness

According to (Nida-Rümelin, 2016)[1], "experiences are such that, undergoing the experience necessarily involves that the subject is aware of undergoing it." This kind of awareness is called primitive awareness:

Primitive awareness is the kind of awareness for which the claim is true that it is impossible to undergo an experience without being aware of undergoing it.


  • (Nida-Rümelin, 2016) assumes that primitive awareness is not the result of introspection or of phenomenal reflection.[1]
  • Since undergoing an experience does not necessarily involve reflecting upon that experience, primitive awareness does not involve phenomenal reflection. Since it seems however to be required as a precondition, primitive awareness seems to be pre-reflective.[1]
  • Since primitive awareness also does not require conceptualizing the experience one undergoes, but seems to be required for forming a concept of a given experience on the basis of one's own experience, it is pre-conceptual.
  • Any experiencing subject is immediately aware, in the sense here at issue, of every specific aspect of what it is like for it to live through moment while it is living through moment .

Phenomenal presence

The clearest case of awareness in this sense are "episodes in which a subject is presented with a c-quale like, for instance, a particular slightly reddish blue, the sound of a violin, the smell of basil or the taste of ginger."[1]

Perceptual awareness

"In perception we are aware of the properties of things around us in a way which intuitively deserves to be called immediate. We seem to have direct access to certain properties of things just by looking. The intuition of immediacy or directness here at issue can be cashed out in various ways and there is no agreement among philosophers about how it should be accounted for."[1]


  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Martine Nida-Rümelin, The experience property framework, 2016