Difference between revisions of "What it is like to be"
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
(Started writing this page) |
(First draft) |
||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
| − | + | The famous term introduced by Thomas Nagel. It is often used to characterize [[phenomenal consciousness]] or [[phenomenal properties]]. | |
| − | + | * Some take "what it is like to be" to denote a property which some [[mental states]] have, whereas others don't. | |
| − | + | * Some take it to refer to some parts/properties/features/elements/aspects of [[conscious experience]] of [[phenomenal consciousness]]. | |
| − | * | + | |
| − | + | One conclusion of Nagel's seminal article<ref>Nagel, Thomas. "What is it like to be a bat?." The philosophical review 83.4 (1974): 435-450.</ref> is that neither science nor philosophy has the beginnings of a conception of the ''identity of what the term "what it is like to be" refers to, on the one hand, and a physical state, on the other''. | |
| + | |||
| + | == References == | ||
| + | <references /> | ||
Revision as of 17:22, 14 June 2020
The famous term introduced by Thomas Nagel. It is often used to characterize phenomenal consciousness or phenomenal properties.
- Some take "what it is like to be" to denote a property which some mental states have, whereas others don't.
- Some take it to refer to some parts/properties/features/elements/aspects of conscious experience of phenomenal consciousness.
One conclusion of Nagel's seminal article[1] is that neither science nor philosophy has the beginnings of a conception of the identity of what the term "what it is like to be" refers to, on the one hand, and a physical state, on the other.
References
- ↑ Nagel, Thomas. "What is it like to be a bat?." The philosophical review 83.4 (1974): 435-450.
