Difference between revisions of "What it is like to be"
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The famous term introduced by Thomas Nagel. It is often used to characterize [[phenomenal consciousness]] or [[phenomenal properties]]. | The famous term introduced by Thomas Nagel. It is often used to characterize [[phenomenal consciousness]] or [[phenomenal properties]]. | ||
* Some take "what it is like to be" to denote a property which some [[mental states]] have, whereas others don't. | * Some take "what it is like to be" to denote a property which some [[mental states]] have, whereas others don't. | ||
| − | * Some take it to refer to some parts/properties/features/elements/aspects of [[conscious experience]] | + | * Some take it to refer to some parts/properties/features/elements/aspects of [[conscious experience]] or [[phenomenal consciousness]]. |
| − | One conclusion of Nagel | + | One conclusion of (Nagel, 1974)<ref>Nagel, Thomas. "What is it like to be a bat?." The philosophical review 83.4 (1974): 435-450.</ref> is that neither science nor philosophy has the beginnings of a conception of the ''identity of what the term "what it is like to be" refers to, on the one hand, and a physical state, on the other''. |
== References == | == References == | ||
<references /> | <references /> | ||
Latest revision as of 16:15, 28 August 2020
Note: This page has not yet reached minimally viable content. Please help improve the page and remove this note when appropriate.
The famous term introduced by Thomas Nagel. It is often used to characterize phenomenal consciousness or phenomenal properties.
- Some take "what it is like to be" to denote a property which some mental states have, whereas others don't.
- Some take it to refer to some parts/properties/features/elements/aspects of conscious experience or phenomenal consciousness.
One conclusion of (Nagel, 1974)[1] is that neither science nor philosophy has the beginnings of a conception of the identity of what the term "what it is like to be" refers to, on the one hand, and a physical state, on the other.
References
- ↑ Nagel, Thomas. "What is it like to be a bat?." The philosophical review 83.4 (1974): 435-450.
