501
edits
Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
*In particular, qualia are often considered to be properties ''of experiences'' the subject undergoing the experience is aware of.<refname="NR16">Martine Nida-Rümelin, ''The experience property frame work'', 2016</ref>*This conception contrasts with [[experiential properties]] that are properties of the experiencing subject. === Qualia as qualitative properties ===In particular, qualia are also taken often defined to be ''constitutequalitative properties'' what it of experiences, where a qualitative property is like related to undergo the [[qualitative character]] of an experience at issue.<ref>Martine (Nida-Rümelin, ''The experience property frame work'', 2016)<ref name="NR16"/ref>Both of these conceptions contrast with argues that this is untenable if one assumes that subjects are [[experiential propertiesawareness|aware]] that are of qualia. === Qualia as properties or features of mental states ===Some define qualia as "particular features of mental states" (arguably Varela<ref>"In the best of cases, the experiencing subjectproblem of consciousness is assimilated with that of 'qualia' for some particular features of mental states." Varela, Neurophenomenology, 1996</ref>)
→Qualia as properties or features of mental states
Qualia are often defined as properties of [[phenomenal consciousness]], [[mental states]] or [[conscious experience]].
== Qualia as simple constituents ==
== Qualia as first order approximations ==
In the recorded lecture underlying<ref>Metzinger, Thomas, ed. Grundkurs Philosophie des Geistes. Mentis., 2007.</ref>, Thomas Metzinger discusses that qualia as ''approximations'' of [[phenomenal consciousness]] or [[consciousness]].
== Qualia as constituting experience ==
Many claim that "the qualia of an experience constitute what it is like for the experiencing subject to undergo that experience".<ref>Martine Nida-Rümelin, ''The experience property framework'', 2016</ref> Qualia in this sense are usually conceived of as properties of experience.
This notion of qualia is much more involved ("stronger") than the previous two. Whereas in the previous two cases, one can think of [[conscious experience]] as primitive and then conceptualize qualia in terms of it, qualia as defined here seems to be intended as more primitive than conscious experience.
== Content qualia ==
Colours, sounds, tastes or odours are examples of what (Nida-Rümelin, 2016)<ref name="NR16"/> calls ''content qualia'', or ''c-qualia'' for short. They belong to the content of an experience, i.e. to what is present to the subject who undergoes an experience.
== Qualia as states ==
Some authors define qualia simply as states of [[phenomenal consciousness]].
With respect to [[experiential properties]], "for a state to have qualia is (...) for the state to be such that the subject has experiential properties by being in that sate".<ref name="NR16"/>
= Properties of features ascribed to qualia =
* transparent
* qualitative in character
=== Qualia determine how it is to have an experience ===
Qualia are sometimes claimed to ''determine'' how it is for the experiencing subject to have an experience.<ref name="NR16"/>
== References ==
<references />
