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== Qualia as first order approximations ==
In the recorded lecture underlying<ref>Metzinger, Thomas, ed. Grundkurs Philosophie des Geistes. Mentis., 2007.</ref>, Thomas Metzinger discusses that qualia as ''approximations'' of [[phenomenal consciousness]] or [[consciousness]].
== Qualia as constituting experience ==
Many claim that "the qualia of an experience constitute what it is like for the experiencing subject to undergo that experience".<ref>Martine Nida-Rümelin, ''The experience property framework'', 2016</ref> Qualia in this sense are usually conceived of as properties of experience.
This notion of qualia is much more involved ("stronger") than the previous two. Whereas in the previous two cases, one can think of [[conscious experience]] as primitive and then conceptualize qualia in terms of it, qualia as defined here seems to be intended as more primitive than conscious experience.
== Qualia as states ==
