Difference between revisions of "Qualia"

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The term ''qualia'' (singular 'quale') is used in many different ways to date.
 
The term ''qualia'' (singular 'quale') is used in many different ways to date.
Let's distinguish the characterizations in terms of examples, the types of term that is being defined,<ref>Can one call this the "logical structure" of the term? - Probably not, please correct.</ref> and the properties or features ascribed to qualia.
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Let's distinguish the characterizations in terms of examples, the types of terms that are being defined,<ref>Can one call this the "logical structure" of the term? - Probably not, please correct.</ref> and the properties or features ascribed to qualia.
  
 
== Definition in terms of examples ==
 
== Definition in terms of examples ==
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* Colours ("seeing red", etc.)
 
* Colours ("seeing red", etc.)
 
* Using the [[what it is like to be]] reference
 
* Using the [[what it is like to be]] reference
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* "raw feels"
 
* Qualia are "introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives" <ref name=SEPQualia>Michael Tye in SEP Entry on Qualia.</ref>
 
* Qualia are "introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives" <ref name=SEPQualia>Michael Tye in SEP Entry on Qualia.</ref>
  
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* Properties of [[phenomenal consciousness]]
 
* Properties of [[phenomenal consciousness]]
 
* Properties of [[mental states]]<ref name=SEPQualia/>
 
* Properties of [[mental states]]<ref name=SEPQualia/>
* Simple constituents of phenomenal consciousness (going as far as "approximations" of phenomenal consciousness)
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* Simple constituents/peroperties of phenomenal consciousness (going as far as "approximations" of phenomenal consciousness)
 
* States of phenomenal consciousness
 
* States of phenomenal consciousness
 
* Sometimes they are claimed to constitute the [[phenomenal character]] ("that together make up the phenomenal character of the experience"<ref name=SEPQualia/>
 
* Sometimes they are claimed to constitute the [[phenomenal character]] ("that together make up the phenomenal character of the experience"<ref name=SEPQualia/>
  
 
== Properties of features ascribed to qualia ==
 
== Properties of features ascribed to qualia ==
 +
Different studies endorse different properties of qualia. Here is a first list of properties that are being ascribed. In philosophical contributions, these properties are used to analyse certain claims, e.g. whether physicalism can be true, whether there is an explanatory gap, etc.
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* intrinsic
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* subjective
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* private
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* ineffable
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* inaccessible on a cognitive, linguistic or verbal account
 +
* homogeneous
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* transparent
  
  
 
== Notes ==
 
== Notes ==
 
<references />
 
<references />

Revision as of 09:18, 29 April 2020

The term qualia (singular 'quale') is used in many different ways to date. Let's distinguish the characterizations in terms of examples, the types of terms that are being defined,[1] and the properties or features ascribed to qualia.

Definition in terms of examples

May publications define the term using examples. E.g.:

  • Colours ("seeing red", etc.)
  • Using the what it is like to be reference
  • "raw feels"
  • Qualia are "introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives" [2]

Logical structure

Various uses seem to appear:

  • Properties of phenomenal consciousness
  • Properties of mental states[2]
  • Simple constituents/peroperties of phenomenal consciousness (going as far as "approximations" of phenomenal consciousness)
  • States of phenomenal consciousness
  • Sometimes they are claimed to constitute the phenomenal character ("that together make up the phenomenal character of the experience"[2]

Properties of features ascribed to qualia

Different studies endorse different properties of qualia. Here is a first list of properties that are being ascribed. In philosophical contributions, these properties are used to analyse certain claims, e.g. whether physicalism can be true, whether there is an explanatory gap, etc.

  • intrinsic
  • subjective
  • private
  • ineffable
  • inaccessible on a cognitive, linguistic or verbal account
  • homogeneous
  • transparent


Notes

  1. Can one call this the "logical structure" of the term? - Probably not, please correct.
  2. 2.0 2.1 2.2 Michael Tye in SEP Entry on Qualia.