Difference between revisions of "Qualia"

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The term ''qualia'' (singular 'quale') is used in many different ways to date.
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The term ''qualia'' (singular 'quale') is used in many different ways to date. This page aims to distinguish the various uses.
Let's distinguish the characterizations in terms of examples, the types of terms that are being defined,<ref>Can one call this the "logical structure" of the term? - Probably not, please correct.</ref> and the properties or features ascribed to qualia.
 
  
 
== Definition in terms of examples ==
 
== Definition in terms of examples ==
Many publications define the term using examples. E.g.:
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Many publications refer to qualia as defined in terms of examples. E.g.:
* Colours ("seeing red", etc.)
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* Colours ("the redness of red", etc.)
* Using the [[what it is like to be]] reference
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* Referring to the [[what it is like to be]] conception
* "raw feels"
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* "Raw feels"
* Qualia are "introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives" <ref name=SEPQualia>Michael Tye in SEP Entry on Qualia.</ref>
 
  
== Logical structure ==
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== Qualia as aspects of conscious experience ==
Various uses seem to appear:
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Some publications define qualia in reference to [[aspects]] of mental lives. This is the case, e.g. in Michael Tye's SEP entry,<ref name="SEPQualia">Tye, Michael, "Qualia", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/qualia/ Link]</ref> where he states that "philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives," where the term aspect arguably may refer to "any specific feature, part, or element of something"<ref>[https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/aspect#English]</ref>.
* Properties of [[phenomenal consciousness]]
 
* Properties of [[mental states]]<ref name=SEPQualia/>
 
* Simple constituents/peroperties of phenomenal consciousness (going as far as "approximations" of phenomenal consciousness)
 
* States of phenomenal consciousness
 
* Sometimes they are claimed to constitute the [[phenomenal character]] ("that together make up the phenomenal character of the experience"<ref name=SEPQualia/>
 
  
== Properties of features ascribed to qualia ==
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A similar route is followed in<ref>Kleiner, Johannes. "Mathematical Models of Consciousness." Entropy 22.6 (2020): 609.</ref>, where qualia are defined as aspects of conscious experience which are [[non-collatability|non-collatable]].
Different studies endorse different properties of qualia. Here is a first list of properties that are being ascribed. In philosophical contributions, these properties are used to analyse certain claims, e.g. whether physicalism can be true, whether there is an explanatory gap, etc.
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== Qualia as properties ==
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Qualia are often defines as properties of [[phenomenal consciousness]] or properties of [[mental states]].
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== Qualia as simple constituents ==
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Some publications define qualia as ''simple constituents'' of [[phenomenal consciousness]] or [[conscious experience]]. In a few cases they are conceived of as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_formula atoms] of the latter.
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In some cases, they are claimed to constitute the [[phenomenal character]]. According to thos use of the term, qualia "together make up the phenomenal character of the experience".<ref name="SEPQualia"/>
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== Qualia as first order approximations ==
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In the recorded lecture underlying<ref>Metzinger, Thomas, ed. Grundkurs Philosophie des Geistes. Mentis., 2007.</ref>, Thomas Metzinger discusses that qualia as ''approximations'' of [[phenomenal consciousness]] or [[consciousness]].
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== Qualia as states ==
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Some authors define qualia simply as states of [[phenomenal consciousness]].
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= Properties of features ascribed to qualia =
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Qualia are variously claimed to have many different properties, features or key characteristics. E.g., they are claimed to be:
 
* intrinsic
 
* intrinsic
 
* subjective
 
* subjective
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* homogeneous
 
* homogeneous
 
* transparent
 
* transparent
* qualitative character
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* qualitative in character
  
  
== Notes ==
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== References ==
 
<references />
 
<references />

Revision as of 18:27, 14 June 2020

The term qualia (singular 'quale') is used in many different ways to date. This page aims to distinguish the various uses.

Definition in terms of examples

Many publications refer to qualia as defined in terms of examples. E.g.:

Qualia as aspects of conscious experience

Some publications define qualia in reference to aspects of mental lives. This is the case, e.g. in Michael Tye's SEP entry,[1] where he states that "philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives," where the term aspect arguably may refer to "any specific feature, part, or element of something"[2].

A similar route is followed in[3], where qualia are defined as aspects of conscious experience which are non-collatable.

Qualia as properties

Qualia are often defines as properties of phenomenal consciousness or properties of mental states.

Qualia as simple constituents

Some publications define qualia as simple constituents of phenomenal consciousness or conscious experience. In a few cases they are conceived of as atoms of the latter.

In some cases, they are claimed to constitute the phenomenal character. According to thos use of the term, qualia "together make up the phenomenal character of the experience".[1]

Qualia as first order approximations

In the recorded lecture underlying[4], Thomas Metzinger discusses that qualia as approximations of phenomenal consciousness or consciousness.

Qualia as states

Some authors define qualia simply as states of phenomenal consciousness.

Properties of features ascribed to qualia

Qualia are variously claimed to have many different properties, features or key characteristics. E.g., they are claimed to be:

  • intrinsic
  • subjective
  • private
  • ineffable
  • inaccessible on a cognitive, linguistic or verbal account
  • homogeneous
  • transparent
  • qualitative in character


References

  1. 1.0 1.1 Tye, Michael, "Qualia", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Link
  2. [1]
  3. Kleiner, Johannes. "Mathematical Models of Consciousness." Entropy 22.6 (2020): 609.
  4. Metzinger, Thomas, ed. Grundkurs Philosophie des Geistes. Mentis., 2007.