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{{note|This page has not yet reached minimally viable content. Please help improve the page and remove this note when appropriate.}}The ''phenomenal consciousness'' conception of conscious experience constitutes the target of much research in the scientific study of consciousness. This page intends to distinguish various different connotations of the term.

which we experience the world. This can roughly be paraphrased as "pure subjectiveexperience"<ref>Thomas Metzinger. The problem of consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger, editor, Con-scious experience, pages 3–37. Imprint Academic, 1995.</ref> This conception of phenomenal consciousness is in fact what is referred to as [[conscious experience]] in this wiki.

The above conceptualization has to be distinguished from Chalmers' use of this term in (Chalmers, 1996),<ref>Chalmers, David J. The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. Oxford university press, 1996.</ref>.There, where he defines ''phenomenal consciousness'' to refer to a conception of consciousness which does not have a ''function'' or ''structure'', where "to have a function" is to have a causal role in the production of behaviour, abd and where the term "structure" is used in a spatio-temporal sense. Cf. [[Chalmers ' axiomatization]].