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Several ways The ''phenomenal consciousness'' conception of conscious experience constitutes the target of much research in the scientific study of consciousness. This page intends to understand this distinguish various connotations of the term exist.

Phenomenal consciousness in the sense of the philosophical discipline of [Explain[phenomenology]]can arguably taken to refer to the totality of how experience ''reveals itself'' to an experiencing subject, to how the experiencing subject finds itself experiencing, to how the ''the world'' appears to him/her. In less loaded terminology, it could possibly be characterized as referring to the totality of impressions, feelings, thoughts, perceptions, etc. which an experiencing subject lives through at a particular instant of time.

Simple term for it could Thus phenomenal consciousness refers to the way in which the world appears to us, i.e. the way inwhich we experience the world. This can roughly be paraphrased as "pure subjective experience" (used e<ref>Thomas Metzinger.gThe problem of consciousness. in In Thomas Metzinger , editor, Con-scious experience, pages 3–37. Imprint Academic, 1995; add reference).</ref> This conception of phenomenal consciousness is in fact what is referred to as [[conscious experience]] in this wiki.

The above conceptualization has to be distinguished from Chalmers' use of this term in <ref>Chalmers , David J. The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. Oxford university press, 1996.</ref>.There, he defines ''phenomenal consciousness '' to refer to those [parts or states?] a conception of consciousness which do does not have a ''function and which do not have a '' or ''structure. Here'', 'where "to have a function' " is to have a causal role in the production of behaviour. The , abd where the term '"structure' " is used in a spatio-temporal sense.Cf. [[Chalmers axiomatization]]. == References==</references>