Difference between revisions of "Phenomenal Concepts"

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== First rough definition ==
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''Phenomenal concepts'' are concepts which one forms when introspecting. They describe what conscious experience appears to be, how conscious experience presents itself to the introspecting subject.
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''Phenomenal concepts'', roughly, are concepts which one forms when introspecting. They describe what conscious experience appears to be, how conscious experience presents itself to the introspecting subject.
 
  
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== Importance ==
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It is important to distinguish phenomenal concepts from [[phenomenal consciousness]] and similar concepts. Models of consciousness generally seem to try to model phenomenal concepts. According to [[illusionism]] or [[eliminativism]], the relation between phenomenal concepts and phenomenal consciousness is non-trivial and complex, so that it would be a mistake to take phenomenal concepts as guiding the construction of theories of consciousness.
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It is important to separate phenomenal concepts from phenomenal experience (or experience in total). If phenomenal concepts are taken at face value, i.e. they are taken to correctly to refer to experience, they determine what models of consciousness should address. But one could also say that the relation between phenomenal concepts and experience is a more complex, or non-trivial, one, e.g. as in [[illusionism]] or [[eliminativism]].
 
  
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In the literature, special features of phenomenal concepts are being used to explain why there might seem to be an [[explanatory gap]]. This "seeming" might be a result of the fact that phenomenal concepts are different in nature to physical concepts.
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In several publications, arguments are advanced which aim to show that special features of phenomenal concepts (which other concepts do not possess) are responsible for the illusion of there being a [[hard problem]] or [[explanatory gap]].

Revision as of 20:07, 14 June 2020

Phenomenal concepts are concepts which one forms when introspecting. They describe what conscious experience appears to be, how conscious experience presents itself to the introspecting subject.

It is important to distinguish phenomenal concepts from phenomenal consciousness and similar concepts. Models of consciousness generally seem to try to model phenomenal concepts. According to illusionism or eliminativism, the relation between phenomenal concepts and phenomenal consciousness is non-trivial and complex, so that it would be a mistake to take phenomenal concepts as guiding the construction of theories of consciousness.

In several publications, arguments are advanced which aim to show that special features of phenomenal concepts (which other concepts do not possess) are responsible for the illusion of there being a hard problem or explanatory gap.

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