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*'''Proto-consciousness induced quantum collapse''' is a refinement of the idea that the act of conscious observation collapses wave functions. Archetypal models of consciousness tend to predict the weak presence of some aspects of consciousness even for some small simple systems. In principle, these quantities can be incorporated into stochastic differential equations that reduce to the Schrödinger equation in the quantum regime and give classical behaviour for macroscopic objects. At intermediate scales, consciousness-like properties (proto-consciousness) can then have noticeable effects on the predictions of such collapse models which can then be tested experimentally<ref name=Vedral2021>Lee K. S.; Vedral V.; et al. (2021), Entanglement between superconducting qubits and a tardigrade. https://arxiv.org/pdf/2112.07978.pdf</ref>. Examples include Quantum Integrated Information (QII)<ref name=Kremnizer2015>Kremnizer K.; Ranchin A. (2015), Integrated Information-Induced Quantum Collapse. Foundations of Physics Vol. 45, pp. 889-899.</ref> induced quantum collapse which extends Integrated Information Theory. Model Unity, in the Expected Float Entropy minimisation model of consciousness, has also been suggested for use in collapse models<ref name=Mason2021/>. More fundamentally, it has been shown that if consciousness does have any forward influence on the physical domain then this will at least manifest itself as an influence on quantum collapse<ref name=Kremnizer2021>Kleiner J.; Kremnizer K. Collapse and the Closure of the Physical. Forthcoming.</ref>.
*The '''[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will_theorem Free will theorem]'''<ref name=Conway2006>Conway J.; Simon K. (2006), The Free Will Theorem. Foundations of Physics Vol. 36 (10): 1441.</ref> shows that, subject to some minimal assumptions, if we have free will, in the sense that our choices are free rather than being a function of past events, then the behaviour of some elementary particles is also not a function of past events. The experience of actual or apparent free will is an aspect of consciousness and the Free Will Theorem is another example of theory in Quantum Mechanics making a potential connection between consciousness and the physical domain. More generally, there are other, often related, notions of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will free will].
 
==Mathematizing phenomenology==
The phenomenology of experience is perhaps the biggest explanandum for a science of consciousness. One approach to its study concerns the structure of conscious experience. The way this is made precise is very much related to the idea of representing the consciousness domain in terms of a mathematical space such as, for example, a state spaces of a dynamical neural system<ref name=Yoshimi2007> Yoshimi, J. (2007), Mathematizing phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6(3), 271–291. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-007-9052-4</ref>, or topological spaces based on particular assumptions about experience<ref name=Stanley1999> Stanley, R. P. (1999), Qualia-Space. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6(1), 49-60.</ref><ref name=Prentner2019> Prentner, R. (2019), Consciousness and Topologically Structured Phenomenal Spaces. Consciousness and Cognition, 70, 25-38.</ref>. Related proposals along these lines have to do with neurophenomenology<ref name=Varela1996> Varela, F. J. (1996), Neurophenomenology: a methodological remedy for the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 330–49.</ref>, mathematical representations of qualia-spaces, or category and process theories of consciousness<ref name=Tsuchiya2021> Tsuchiya, N.; Saigo, H. (2021), A relational approach to consciousness: categories of level and contents of consciousness. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 7(2), niab034.</ref><ref name=SignorelliWangCoecke2021> Signorelli, C. M.; Wang, Q.; Coecke, B. (2021), Reasoning about Conscious Experience with Axiomatic and Graphical Models. Consciousness and Cognition, 95:103168.</ref>.
 
Such representations could serve as precise statements (or models) of target phenomena for use in archetypal models of consciousness to help establish the relationship between states of neurocomputational systems and states of consciousness. More speculatively, phenomenal experiences could be seen not only as descriptive but as co-emergent with<ref name=Thompson2007> Thompson, E. (2007), Mind in Life. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.</ref>, or constitutive of<ref name=Fields2018> Fields, C.; Hoffman, D. D.; Prakash, C.; Singh M. (2018), Conscious Agent Networks: Formal Analysis and Application to Cognition. Cognitive Systems Research, 47, 186-213.</ref>, the neuroscientific phenomena that supposedly explain them.
==Model validation==

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