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Formulating mathematical and computational models and theories of consciousness inevitably involves making a number of philosophical assumptions. Typically, some assumptions are stated explicitly as model assumptions whilst others are implicit. It is also the case that models are usually independent of at least some philosophical positions allowing them to be extended in different directions if needed. For example, neither IIT or EFE minimisation exclude the possibility of the physical being open. Examples of philosophical assumptions include, consciousness being an [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenon epiphenomena] or not, the content of consciousness being defined by the system itself or involving something extrinsic to the system, privacy of experiences, the role of free-will, and other metaphysical assumptions. Philosophical frameworks include, amongst others, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism physicalism], [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_dualism dualism], [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism idealism], [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double-aspect_theory dual-aspect monism], and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutral_monism natural monism]. An important argument, sometimes attributed to [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertrand_Russell Bertrand Russell] and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_Eddington Arthur Eddington], says that physical properties in nature are extrinsic manifestations of intrinsic properties; that is to say, seen from the outside, the relationships in nature give us physics, chemistry and biology, but seen from the inside they yield conscious experience<ref name=GoffandError2019Goff2019> Goff, P.; Error, G. (2019), Galileo's Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness. London: Rider Books, Penguin Random House.</ref>. Similar intuition has played a part in the formulation of several mathematical models of consciousness including IIT and EFE minimisation.