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(Metzinger, 2003)<ref>https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHEN.0000007366.42918.eb</ref> distinguishes four different types of introspection.

;Definition: Introspection₁ is sub-symbolic metarepresentation operating on a pre-existing, coherent world-model. This type of introspection is a phenomenal process of attentionally representing certain aspects of an internal system state (this is why it can be conceptually described as a form of ''intro''spection), the intentional content of which is constituted by a part of the world depicted ''as external''.

ment. Introspection corresponds to the ''folk-psychological notion of attention''.

;Definition: Introspection₂ refers to a conceptual (or quasi-conceptual) form of metarepresentation, operating on a pre-existing, coherent model of the world. This kind of introspection is brought about by a process of phenomenally representing a cognitive reference to certain aspects of an internal system state, the intentional content of which is constituted by a part of the world depicted ''as external''.

rience of ongoing cognitive reference.

;Definition: Introspection₃ is a subsymbolic metarepresentation operating on a pre-existing, coherent self-model, i.e., a dynamic, multimodal representation of the system as a whole.<ref>For the notion of a “self-model” see Metzinger 1999, 2000, 2003.</ref> This type of introspective experience is generated by processes of phenomenal representation, which direct attention towards certain aspects of an internal system state, the intentional content of which is being constituted by a part of the world depicted ''as internal''.

of phenomenally experienced introspection that underlies classical theories of ''inner perception'', e.g., in John Locke or Franz Brentano

The general phenomenology associated with this type of representational

philosophers of mind have traditionally been most interested: the phenomenon

of cognitive self-reference as exhibited in reflexive self-consciousness.

= References =