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== Conventional use of the term ==
In most of the existing literature, the following definition of explanatory gap is used:
;Definition: <math>X</math> exhibits an explanatory gap if <math>X</math> cannot be derived logically from physical facts or physical theories. I.e., if it cannot be deduced.
Here, <math>X</math> usually denotes a conception of [[phenomenal experience]] or a variation of [[qualia]], and "physical facts" or "physical theories" refer to the [[physical broadly construed]].
The problem with the above definition is that deductive forms of explanations are not the only forms of explanation in science. While deductive forms were first thought to be prevalent (most notably in Hempel's key article<ref>Hempel, Deductive Nomological Model of Explanation</ref>), philosophy of science has quickly realized that there are many other notions of explanation in use in science.
This point has been made particularly clear by (Elanor Taylor, 2015). She argues that explanatory gaps need to be studied relative to the different connotations of explanations that arguably are in use in science. Alternatively, it might be tempting to define an explanatory gap as in the next section.
== Updated definition ==
;Definition:
There is an ''explanatory gap'' between a phenomenon <math>P</math> and natural science if the phenomenon violates a necessary condition of all notions of explanation that are considered valid in science.
Created page with " == Conventional use of the term == In most of the existing literature, the following definition of explanatory gap is used: ;Definition: <math>X</math> exhibits an explanat..."
== Conventional use of the term ==
In most of the existing literature, the following definition of explanatory gap is used:
;Definition: <math>X</math> exhibits an explanatory gap if <math>X</math> cannot be derived logically from physical facts or physical theories. I.e., if it cannot be deduced.
Here, <math>X</math> usually denotes a conception of [[phenomenal experience]] or a variation of [[qualia]], and "physical facts" or "physical theories" refer to the [[physical broadly construed]].
The problem with the above definition is that deductive forms of explanations are not the only forms of explanation in science. While deductive forms were first thought to be prevalent (most notably in Hempel's key article<ref>Hempel, Deductive Nomological Model of Explanation</ref>), philosophy of science has quickly realized that there are many other notions of explanation in use in science.
This point has been made particularly clear by (Elanor Taylor, 2015). She argues that explanatory gaps need to be studied relative to the different connotations of explanations that arguably are in use in science. Alternatively, it might be tempting to define an explanatory gap as in the next section.
== Updated definition ==
;Definition:
There is an ''explanatory gap'' between a phenomenon <math>P</math> and natural science if the phenomenon violates a necessary condition of all notions of explanation that are considered valid in science.
