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;Definition: As a result of the above, one might be tempted to define an explanatory gap as follows. Let again <math>\mathcal P</math> denote the description of a phenomenon <math>XP</math> exhibits .;Definition 2: There is an ''explanatory gap if '' between a phenomenon <math>XP</math> cannot be derived logically from physical facts or physical theories. I.e., if it cannot be deduced. Here, and natural science iff <math>X\mathcal P</math> usually denotes violates a conception necessary condition of [[phenomenal experience]] or a variation all notions of [[qualia]], and "physical facts" or "physical theories" refer to the [[physical broadly construed]]explanation that are considered valid in science.
The problem with the above definition is that deductive forms of explanations are not the only forms of explanation in science. While deductive forms were first thought to be prevalent (most notably in Hempel's key article<ref>Hempel, Deductive Nomological Model of Explanation</ref>), philosophy of science has quickly realized that there are many other notions of explanation in use in science.= Existence =
This point has been made particularly clear by (Elanor TaylorIt does not seem unreasonable that Definition 2 can actually be satisfied. In virtue of being scientific explanations, 2015)the various modes of explanation might make common assumptions. E.g. She argues , one such assumption could be that explanatory gaps need to the phenomenon is intersubjectively accessible, which might not be studied relative to the different connotations case for certain aspects of conscious experience. Cf. <ref>Kleiner, Johannes. "Mathematical Models of Consciousness." Entropy 22.6 (2020): 609.</ref> for one way of explanations that arguably are in use in scienceconceptualising this. AlternativelySince Definition 2 implies Definition 1, it might be tempting to define an explanatory gap as in the next sectionsame holds mutatis mutandis w.r.t. the latter.
== Updated definition ==
;Definition: There is an ''explanatory gap'' between a phenomenon <math>P== References ==<references /math> and natural science if the phenomenon violates a necessary condition of all notions of explanation that are considered valid in science.
Johannes Kleiner moved page Explanatory gap to Explanatory Gap
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= Definitions =
== Conventional use of the term ==
In most of the existing literature, the following definition of explanatory gap is used:<ref>For the emphasis of deductive notions of explanation, cf. Taylor, Elanor. "Explanation and the explanatory gap." Acta Analytica 31.1 (2016): 77-88.</ref> Let <math>\mathcal P</math> denote the description of a phenomenon <math>P</math>.
;Definition 1: <math>P</math> exhibits an explanatory gap iff <math>\mathcal P</math> cannot be deduced (i.e. derived logically) from physical facts or physical theories.
Here, <math>P</math> usually denotes a type of [[phenomenal consciousness]] or a conception of [[qualia]], and "physical facts" or "physical theories" refer to the [[physical broadly construed]].
The problem with the above definition is that deductive forms of explanations are not the only forms of explanation in science. While deductive forms were first thought to be prevalent<ref>Hempel, Deductive Nomological Model of Explanation</ref>, there are in fact many other notions of explanation in use in science.
This point has been made particularly clear by<ref>Taylor, Elanor. "Explanation and the explanatory gap." Acta Analytica 31.1 (2016): 77-88.</ref>. She argues that explanatory gaps need to be studied relative to the different connotations of explanations that arguably are in use in science. Alternatively, it might be tempting to define an explanatory gap as in the next section.
== Conventional use of the term Updated definition ==In most of the existing literature, the following definition of explanatory gap is used:
