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== Conventional use As a result of the term ==In most of the existing literatureabove, one might be tempted to define an explanatory gap as follows. Let again <math>\mathcal P</math> denote the following definition description of a phenomenon <math>P</math>.;Definition 2: There is an ''explanatory gap is used:'' between a phenomenon <math>P</math> and natural science iff <math>\mathcal P</math> violates a necessary condition of all notions of explanation that are considered valid in science.
;Definition: <math>X</math> exhibits an explanatory gap if <math>X</math> cannot be derived logically from physical facts or physical theories. I.e., if it cannot be deduced. Here, <math>X</math> usually denotes a conception of [[phenomenal experience]] or a variation of [[qualia]], and "physical facts" or "physical theories" refer to the [[physical broadly construed]].= Existence =
The problem with the above definition is It does not seem unreasonable that deductive forms Definition 2 can actually be satisfied. In virtue of being scientific explanations are not , the only forms various modes of explanation in sciencemight make common assumptions. While deductive forms were first thought to E.g., one such assumption could be that the phenomenon is intersubjectively accessible, which might not be prevalent (most notably in Hempel's key articlethe case for certain aspects of conscious experience. Cf. <ref>HempelKleiner, Deductive Nomological Model Johannes. "Mathematical Models of ExplanationConsciousness." Entropy 22.6 (2020): 609.</ref>)for one way of conceptualising this. Since Definition 2 implies Definition 1, philosophy of science has quickly realized that there are many other notions of explanation in use in sciencethe same holds mutatis mutandis w.r.t. the latter.
This point has been made particularly clear by (Elanor Taylor, 2015). She argues that explanatory gaps need to be studied relative to the different connotations of explanations that arguably are in use in science. Alternatively, it might be tempting to define an explanatory gap as in the next section.
Johannes Kleiner moved page Explanatory gap to Explanatory Gap
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= Definitions =
== Conventional use of the term ==
In most of the existing literature, the following definition of explanatory gap is used:<ref>For the emphasis of deductive notions of explanation, cf. Taylor, Elanor. "Explanation and the explanatory gap." Acta Analytica 31.1 (2016): 77-88.</ref> Let <math>\mathcal P</math> denote the description of a phenomenon <math>P</math>.
;Definition 1: <math>P</math> exhibits an explanatory gap iff <math>\mathcal P</math> cannot be deduced (i.e. derived logically) from physical facts or physical theories.
Here, <math>P</math> usually denotes a type of [[phenomenal consciousness]] or a conception of [[qualia]], and "physical facts" or "physical theories" refer to the [[physical broadly construed]].
The problem with the above definition is that deductive forms of explanations are not the only forms of explanation in science. While deductive forms were first thought to be prevalent<ref>Hempel, Deductive Nomological Model of Explanation</ref>, there are in fact many other notions of explanation in use in science.
This point has been made particularly clear by<ref>Taylor, Elanor. "Explanation and the explanatory gap." Acta Analytica 31.1 (2016): 77-88.</ref>. She argues that explanatory gaps need to be studied relative to the different connotations of explanations that arguably are in use in science. Alternatively, it might be tempting to define an explanatory gap as in the next section.
== Updated definition ==
== Updated definition References ==;Definition:There is an ''explanatory gap'' between a phenomenon <math>P<references /math> and natural science if the phenomenon violates a necessary condition of all notions of explanation that are considered valid in science.
