501
edits
Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
=== '''First variant ===:''' According to a first variant, a mental state is conscious if its content is available for rational thought and control of behavior. Intentional mental states can be conscious according to this conception, but also beliefs or sensory states such as sensations. This is closely related to [[consciousness#Access consciousness|access consciousness]]. === Second variant ===According to a second general variant of the unary predicate of mental states connotation of consciousness, mental states are conscious ''if we experience'' [[what it is like to be]] in the respective state, or ''alternatively'' if ''there is something'' [[what it is like to be|it is like to be]] in that statecf. A third, closely related but distinct notion would be to define a mental state as conscious if we know of the mental state's qualitative features ("Kenntnis der Erlebnisqualitäten" in German<ref name="MetzingerLexikon"/>)below.
The content of '''Second variant:'''According to a mental state which generates the property required by this second general variant of the unary predicate of mental states conception, mental states are conscious ''if we experience'' [[consciousness#'What it is often claimed like to be private (non-public) ' consciousness|what it is like to be]] in the sense that respective state, or ''alternatively'' if ''there is something'' [[consciousness#'What it is like to be' consciousness|it is only available for like to be]] in that state. A third, closely related but distinct notion would be to define a mental state as conscious if we ''know'' of the person that exhibits this mental state's qualitative features.
This connotation of consciousness includes both pre-conceptual [[attention]] of external objects or states of one's body, as well as conceptually structured consciousness of objects (e.g. in a description).<ref name="MetzingerLexikon" /> It is an ''intentional'' notion of consciousness, as according to this notion, consciousness is always about something. == Binary predicate of mental states ===
=== General ===
The general sense of the term from phenomenology, cf. [[Phenomenal_consciousness#Meaning from phenomenology|phenomenal consciousness - meaning from phenomenology]].
=== "Pure subjective experience ===This can roughly be paraphrased as "pure subjectiveexperience"<ref>Thomas Metzingeris sometimes used to characterize or illustrate a notion of phenomenal consciousness. The problem word ''pure'' may arguably be taken to imply that this notion does not refer to all of consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger[[conscious experience]], editorbut only to some properties or aspect thereof, Conpossibly those aspects which do not have a function or structure (cf. [[Chalmers' axiomatization]]) or those aspects which are [[non-scious experience, pages 3–37. Imprint Academic, 1995collatable]].</ref>
;Definition:Subject <math>S</math> instantiates property <math>A_p</math>Conscious experience, being access conscious of <math>p</math> iff# <math>S</math> has or simply experience, refers a mechanism <math>M</math> for making information directly available for us in directing a wide range comprehensive notion of behaviours; and# <math>M</math> is making consciousness that tries to comprise all others. Cf. the information that <math>p</math> directly available for directing a wide range of potential behvaiours of <math>S</math>page [[conscious experience]].
Some criticize Conscious experience in this notion of consciousness and argue that it should merely be called "access", rather than "access consciousness"sense is what [[Integrated Information Theory]] tries to address.<ref>Citation missing.</ref>
;Definition: Introspective consciousness is a perception-like awareness of current states Consciousness sometimes refers to the conceptually structured and activities in our own mind. The current activities will include sense-perception: which latter is the reflexive awareness of current states and activities of our environment and our body.<ref>Güven Güzeldere; ''Is consciousness the perception of what passes in one's own mind?''as a single, persistent person with certain beliefs, 1995intentions, citing Amstrong Detc. ''The nature of mind and other essays'', 1980<ref name="MetzingerLexikon" /ref>
For == Conscious mechanism ==Some publications talk about a distinction of various forms of introspection and general information on the neuroanatomical basis of consciousnessbrain ''mechanism'' being conscious or not conscious. Most likely, cf. this can be taken to refer to [[introspectionneural correlates of consciousness]](NCC), where a mechanism "is conscious" if it is part of the NCC, though in the studies in question this notion is often used in a somewhat intuitive sense without explicit consideration of the definition of a NCC.
no edit summary
{{note|This page has not yet reached minimally viable contentis an initial draft and needs to be improved and extended. Please You're cordially invited to help improve the page and remove this note when appropriatedoing so.}}This page lists various connotations of the term "consciousness" in use in scientific research today. The fact that so many different conceptions of this term are being applied highlights the striking contrast between the conceptual exposition and the familiarity of consciousness.<ref name="MetzingerLexikon">Metzinger, Encyclopedia entry ''Bewusstsein'', 2008</ref>
The fact that so many different conceptions of this term are being applied highlights the striking contrast between the conceptual exposition and the familiarity of consciousness.<ref name="MetzingerLexikon">Metzinger, Encyclopedia entry ''Bewusstsein'', 2009, in H.-J. Sandkühler (Editor), ''Enzyklopädie der Philosophie''. Hamburg: Meiner. </ref> Some of the distinctions below are from inspired by (Metzinger, 20082009).<ref name="MetzingerLexikon"/>
= Logical structures of the term consciousness =
We first distinguish various different logical structures of the term "consciousness" that are being employed, such as the type of predicate and the class of referents.
=== Unary predicate of organisms individual beings ===
Often, the term "consciousness" is being used as a unary predicate, i.e. it is a predicate that takes one "variable". This variable often describes organisms, persons, subjects or the like.
''Example:'' Consciousness in this sense could refer to whether a person is in a state of [[consciousness#wakefullnessWakefulness|wakefulness]], cf. below.
=== Unary predicate of mental states ===
Consciousness is also being used as a ''property'' of mental states.
=== Binary predicate of organisms individual beings ===
The term "conscious" is also being used as a binary predicate, i.e. a predicate which takes two "variables". In one way of using the term, one of the variables refers to individual beings such as persons or organisms, and the other refers to objects of perception or thinking, cf. [[consciousness#Consciousness in the intentional sense|consciousness in the intentional sense]] below.
''Example:'' A person is conscious of a red tomato.
The term consciousness is also being used as a binary predicate which refers to persons or organisms, on the one hand, and to their mental states on the other hand.
This is the case, e.g., if "consciousness" is taken to denote the [[attention]] of a person on his/her own mental states. This connotation of Cf. [[consciousness can be both pre-conceptual #Introspective consciousness|introspective consciousness]] or conceptual<ref name="MetzingerLexikon" />[[consciousness#Attentive consciousness|attentive consciousness]] below.
= Meanings of the term consciousness =
In what follows, we aim to list and distinguish the various types of meaning of the term "consciousness" that are being considered in the interdisciplinary literature. Many While many overlap in their respective meaning or reference to some extent, it is important to note that they are all different when it comes to details. A few have already been mentioned above as examples Thus a theory or empirical study which addresses one of the various logical structuresthem may be misleading if interpreted to apply to another.
== Conscious perception of a stimulus ==
Arguably, this conception of consciousness is the primary target of [[global neuronal workspace theory]] and its prediction of conscious "ignition", a sudden, late and sustained firing in GNW neurons should a stimulus be perceived consciously.<ref>Dehaene, Stanislas, Jean-Pierre Changeux, and Lionel Naccache. "The global neuronal workspace model of conscious access: from neuronal architectures to clinical applications." Characterizing consciousness: From cognition to the clinic?. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011. 55-84.</ref>
== Conscious mechanism Access consciousness ==Some publications talk The term has originally been introduced by (Block, 1995)<ref>Block, Ned. "On a confusion about a function of consciousness." Behavioral and brain sciences 18.2 (1995): 227-247.</ref>. Following (Shea, 2012)<ref>Shea, Nicholas. "Methodological encounters with the phenomenal kind." Philosophy and phenomenological research 84.2 (2012): 307.</ref>, it could be defined as follows: ;Definition: Subject <math>S</math> instantiates property <math>A_p</math>, being access conscious of <math>p</math>, iff# <math>S</math> has a mechanism <math>M</math> for making information directly available for us in directing a wide range of behaviours; and# <math>M</math> is making the information that <math>p</math> directly available for directing a wide range of potential behvaiours of <math>S</math>. Some criticize this notion of consciousness and argue that it should merely be called "access", rather than "access consciousness".<ref>Citation missing.</ref> The above defines a binary predicate referring to subjects, on the one hand, and phenomenal properties (<math>p</math>) on the other. Alternatively, access consciousness can be defined as a unary predicate referring to mental states, where a mental state is (access) conscious if its content is available for rational thought and control of behavior. Intentional mental states can be conscious according to this conception, but also beliefs or sensory states such as sensations.<ref name="MetzingerLexikon" /> == Introspective consciousness == ;Definition: Introspective consciousness is a perception-like awareness of current states and activities in our own mind. The current activities will include sense-perception, which (...) is the awareness of current states and activities of our environment and our body.<ref name="Guel">Güven Güzeldere; ''Is consciousness the perception of what passes in one's own mind?'', 1995, citing Amstrong D. ''mechanismThe nature of mind and other essays'' , 1980.</ref> For a distinction of various forms of introspection and general information on the neuroanatomical basis of consciousness, cf. the page [[introspection]]. == Attentive consciousness == The term consciousness is also used to describe a person being conscious [[attention|attentionally]] aware of her mental states.<ref name="MetzingerLexikon" /> Consciousness understood in this sense can be both pre-conceptual or notconceptually structured. This may conception is related to [[consciousness#introspective consciousness|introspective consciousness]] as well as to higher order knowledge of one's own mental states. == 'What it is like to be taken ' consciousness ==Cf. the page [[what it is like to implicitly refer be]]. This can be applied, e.g., to mental states: Mental states are conscious ''if we experience'' [[what it is like to be]] in the respective state, or ''alternatively'' if ''there is something'' [[neural correlates of consciousnesswhat it is like to be|it is like to be]] in that state. A third, closely related but distinct notion would be to define a mental state as conscious if we know of the mental state's qualitative features (NCC"Kenntnis der Erlebnisqualitäten" in German<ref name="MetzingerLexikon"/>), where . The content of a mechanism "mental state which generates the property required here is conscious" if often claimed to be private (non-public) in the sense that it is part of only available for the NCCperson that exhibits this mental state.
== Phenomenal consciousness ==
At least two connotations of phenomenal consciousness exist.
=== General definition ===The general sense of the term from phenomenology, cf. the page [[Phenomenal_consciousness#Meaning from phenomenology|phenomenal consciousness, meaning from phenomenology]]. === Definition in Chalmers' axiomatization ===A notion defined in (Chalmers 1996)<ref>Chalmers, David J. The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. Oxford university press, 1996.</ref>, cf. the page [[Phenomenal_consciousness#Chalmers' definition|phenomenal consciousness - , Chalmers' definition]]. == Consciousness in the intentional sense == Consciousness in the intentional sense refers to the relation of a person with objects of perception or thinking. This connotation of consciousness includes both pre-conceptual [[attention]] of external objects or states of one's body, as well as conceptually structured consciousness of objects (e.g. in a description).<ref name="MetzingerLexikon" /> It is an ''intentional'' notion of consciousness because according to this notion, consciousness is always about something. == Pure subjective experience ==
== Access consciousness Conscious experience ==The term has originally been introduced by (Block, 1995)<ref>Block, Ned. "On a confusion about a function of consciousness." Behavioral and brain sciences 18.2 (1995): 227-247.</ref>. Following (Shea, 2012)<ref>Shea, Nicholas. "Methodological encounters with the phenomenal kind." Philosophy and phenomenological research 84.2 (2012): 307.</ref>, it could be defined as follows:
== Introspective Self-consciousness ==
== Conscious and unconscious processing ==
Similar to the [[consciousness#conscious mechanism|conscious mechanism]] conception of consciousness, some papers distinguish conscious (neural) processing from unconscious (neural) processing. This can probably also be fleshed out in terms of the [[neural correlate of consciousness]] and seems to be intimately bound to the [[consciousness#conscious perception of a stimulus|conscious perception of a stimulus]] conception of consciousness. == System State vs. creature consciousness == Creature consciousness,<ref>Rosenthal, ''Why are verbally expressed thoughts conscious?'', 1990.</ref> also called ''individual consciousness'',<ref name="Guel" /> refers to the [[consciousness#wakefulness|wakefulness]] conception of consciousness when applied to individual beings. State consciousness generally denotes a notion of consciousness which is a [[consciousness#unary predicate of mental states|unary predicate of mental states]].It thus "classifies one's (mental) states as of one type or another"<ref name="Guel"/> and "functions as a type-identifier for mental states". It is likely that here, too, (Rosenthal, 2002)<ref>Rosenthal, ''Explaining Consciousness'', 2002.</ref> and (Güzeldere, 1995)<ref name="Guel"/> refer to the [[consciousness#wakefulness|wakefulness]] conception of consciousness, though it can be interpreted also to refer to some of the other connotations of consciousness introduced above.
== Wakefulness ==
The term consciousness is often used to denote a person/organism being in a state of wakefulness, capable of processing and reacting to stimuli. This is also circumscribed by the terms "awake" and "alert".<ref name="Guel"/>
== Qualia ==
There are many different connotations of qualia, some of which can be applied to several different connotations of the term consciousness. Cf. the page [[qualia]].
== Level of consciousness ==
This conception of consciousness is utilized in formal model building, such as [[Integrated Information Theory]]. There are at least two different conceptions thereof.
=== ... of an individual being ===
The first conception is a further development of the [[consciousness#wakefulness|wakefulness]] conception of conscious experience. Whereas the latter is a predicate, i.e. a function symbol which takes values <math>0</math> or <math>1</math>, depending on whether an individual being is conscious in this sense or not, the level of consciousness conception of consciousness attempts to introduce more fine-grained distinctions. It describes various different states of consciousness (of an individual being as a whole), including coma, sleep, drowsiness and full wakefulness, among many others.
The individual being conception of the level of consciousness is often modeled as a real number, with a lower number indicating a lower state of consciousness of the person/organism/system in question. However, it is questionable whether this mathematical structure is appropriate. If one demands a operational grounding of the mathematical structure, a [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preorder preorder] might be more appropriate.
=== ... of an constituent/aspect of conscious experience ===
The level of consciousness conception can arguably also be applied to constituents of, or aspects of, conscious experience in order to describe how intense a particular constituent or aspect of experience is being experienced within the whole of experience. This is being done, e.g., in IIT 3.0, where the constituents are called 'concepts' and where the <math>\varphi(M)</math> of a mechanism <math>M</math> that constitutes a concept is a real number which arguably serves this purpose.
== References ==
<references />
