501
edits
Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
== Access consciousness ==
The term has originally been introduced by (Block, 1995)<ref>Block, Ned. "On a confusion about a function of consciousness." Behavioral and brain sciences 18.2 (1995): 227-247.</ref>. Following (Shea, 2012)<ref>Shea, Nicholas. "Methodological encounters with the phenomenal kind." Philosophy and phenomenological research 84.2 (2012): 307.</ref>, it could be defined as follows:
;Definition:
Subject <math>S</math> instantiates property <math>A_p</math>, being access conscious of <math>p</math> iff
# <math>S</math> has a mechanism <math>M</math> for making information directly available for us in directing a wide range of behaviours; and
# <math>M</math> is making the information that <math>p</math> directly available for directing a wide range of potential behvaiours of <math>S</math>.
Some criticize this notion of consciousness and argue that it should merely be called "access", rather than "access consciousness".<ref>Citation missing.</ref>
Intentional mental states can be conscious according to this conception, but also beliefs or sensory states such as sensations.
→Meanings of the term consciousness
Arguably, this conception of consciousness is the primary target of [[global neuronal workspace theory]] and its prediction of conscious "ignition", a sudden, late and sustained firing in GNW neurons should a stimulus be perceived consciously.<ref>Dehaene, Stanislas, Jean-Pierre Changeux, and Lionel Naccache. "The global neuronal workspace model of conscious access: from neuronal architectures to clinical applications." Characterizing consciousness: From cognition to the clinic?. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011. 55-84.</ref>
== Access consciousness ==
The term has originally been introduced by (Block, 1995)<ref>Block, Ned. "On a confusion about a function of consciousness." Behavioral and brain sciences 18.2 (1995): 227-247.</ref>. Following (Shea, 2012)<ref>Shea, Nicholas. "Methodological encounters with the phenomenal kind." Philosophy and phenomenological research 84.2 (2012): 307.</ref>, it could be defined as follows:
;Definition:
Subject <math>S</math> instantiates property <math>A_p</math>, being access conscious of <math>p</math> iff
# <math>S</math> has a mechanism <math>M</math> for making information directly available for us in directing a wide range of behaviours; and
# <math>M</math> is making the information that <math>p</math> directly available for directing a wide range of potential behvaiours of <math>S</math>.
Some criticize this notion of consciousness and argue that it should merely be called "access", rather than "access consciousness".<ref>Citation missing.</ref>
Intentional mental states can be conscious according to this conception, but also beliefs or sensory states such as sensations.
== Introspective consciousness ==
experience"<ref>Thomas Metzinger. The problem of consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger, editor, Con-
scious experience, pages 3–37. Imprint Academic, 1995.</ref>
