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→Unary predicate of mental states
Intentional mental states can be conscious according to this conception, but also beliefs or sensory states such as sensations. This is closely related to [[consciousness#Access consciousness|access consciousness]].
'''Second variant:''' According to a second general variant of the unary predicate of mental states connotation of consciousness, mental states are conscious ''if we experience'' [[what it is like]] to be in the respective state, or ''alternatively'' if ''there is something'' [[it is like|what it is like]] to be in that state. A third, closely related but distinct notion would be to define a mental state as conscious if we know of the mental state's qualitative features ("Kenntnis der Erlebnisqualitäten" in German<ref name=MetzingerLexikon" />).
The content of a mental state which generates the property required by this second variant is often claimed to be private (non-public) in the sense that it is only available for the person that exhibits this mental state.
=== Binary predicate of organisms ===
