The definition is thus relative to experiencing subjects and the reference changes with time. Another, possibly more useful way of stating the same idea could be:<ref>Van Gulick, ''Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We all Just Armadillos?'', 1993</ref>
;Definition: Phenomenal experience is not merely a succession of qualitatively distinguished sensory ideas, but rather the organized cognitive experience of a world of objects and of ourselves as subject within that world.
== Type ==
*Conscious experiences can be viewed as a subclass of ''events''.<ref name="MNR">Martine Nida-Rümelin, ''The experience property frame work'', 2016</ref> "Events may be understood as involving things which instantiate properties. (...) The subclass of experiences can be characterized by saying that the individuals involved are experiencing subjects who instantiate [[experiential properties]]", according to the proposal of (Nida-Rümelin, 2016).<ref name="MNR" />
== Relation to other connotations of consciousness ==